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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STA TE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsTHE STATE BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellant,
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a corporate body politic, and

Case No.
13003

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE

AND APPLIED SCIENCE,
Plaintiffs in Intervention and Respondents.

BRIEF OF UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge.

NAWRE OF THE CASE

This action was filed by the State Board of Education. It
challenges the constitutionality of the High Education Act of
1969. (The Act, Chapter 48, Tide 53, Utah Code Annotated)
The assertion is that the Act encroaches on the powers and
duties vested by the Constitution in the State Board of Education
under Article X, §§ 2 and 8. Article X, § 2, defines the public
school system to include:
" . . . kindergarten schools; common schools, consisting of primary and grammer schools; high schools,
an agricultural college; a university; and such other
schools as the Legislature may establish.
1

Article X, § 8 vests:
"The general control and superv1s1on of the public
school system . . . . . in a State Board of Education,
the members of which shall be elected as provided by
law. . . . "
The University of Utah intervened. It specifically desired
to have the court also consider Article X, § 4, which provides
that:
"The location and establishment by existing laws of
the University of Utah and the agricultural college are
hereby confirmed, and all the rights, immunities, fran.
chises and endowments heretofore granted or conferred, are hereby perpetuated unto said University and
Agricultural College respectively."
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was presented to the lower court on motions
for summary judgment by both plaintiff and defendant. The
court granted plaintiff's motion, and decreed that the Higher
Education Act of 1969 is null and void, and unconstirutional,
being in conflict with Sections 2 and 8, Article X of the Utah
Constitution. The trial court further concluded that this determination made it unnecessary to determine whether or not
the authority and power conferred upon the Board of Higher
Education also conflicts with Article X, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, which deals with the University of Utah and the agricultural college, now Utah State University.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The University of Utah seeks to affirm the decision of the
Lower Court, and if the decision is affirmed, to have the Su·
preme Court indicate what the relationship should be between
2

the University of Utah under Section 4 and the plaintiff (State
Board of Education) under Section 8.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
As we will demonstrate, the State Board of Higher Education is an entity separate and apart both from the University
and from the State Board of Education. The powers and duties
expressly granted to the State Board of Higher Education leave
essentially no functions with the University or with the plaintiffs State Board of Education. Thus, the University of Utah
asserts that the Act is unconstitutional, because it violates both
Section 4 and Section 8 of Article X.
There may be a question as to who should speak for the
University in this litigation, but we believe that there is no
doubt that the University's position should be asserted. The
Board of Regents was abolished by the Act. The Act, as we
shall see, purported to vest in the Higher Board all of the
essential functions of the University. From the answer and
legal memoranda filed by the Higher Board, there is no guest1on as to its position. If it could speak for the University,
it would have the University urge that the Act is constitutional,
and does not violate either Section 4 or Section 8. Present counsel for the University were appointed by the Attorney General.
They, the President of the University of Utah, and the Institutional Council at the University all assert that the Act is unconstitutional. It is the University as an institution which has
intervened, and it is the University which is before the court.

3

POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1969 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
There has been a long line of decisions by Utah
Supreme Court which have held that the Legislature may not
create separate statutory boards and give them powers which
encroach upon the powers and duties of constitutional boards
and officers.
In Allen v. Rampton, 23 Ut. 2d 336, 463 P. 2d 7 ( 1969),
the court held unconstitutional the State Money Management
Act, because it encroached upon the constitutional powers and
duties of the State Treasurer under Article VII, § 17. That
section provides:
". . . . . the Treasurer shall be the custodian of public
moneys, and . . . . shall perform such other duties as
may be provided by law."
The court noted that the State Money Management Act,
among other things, created a division of investments and an
investment council to be composed of the State Treasurer, the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and three other mem·
bers appointed by the Governor. The Act provided for employment of a chief administrative officer and financial analyst,
and empowered the council to promulgate the rules pertaining
to the investment of public funds. The court noted that the
Constitution did not detail what the duties of the treasurer are,
because prior to the adoption of the Constitution the duties
were so well known that the framers of the Constitution may
have considered it unnecessary to detail them. The court cited
State ex rel Josephs v. Douglas, 33 Nev. 82, 110 P. 177
4

( 1910) to the effect that every constitutional officer derives
his power and authority from the Constitution, and the Legislature is powerless to add to those duties, or to take away
duties which naturally belong to the constitutional office. The
court also quoted from Hudson v. Kelly, 76 Ariz. 225, 263
P. 2d 362 ( 1953) where the court held that a statute requiring
a constitutional officer to be subservient to the dictates of
some appointive officer is equivalent to abolishing the off ice
and creating another in lieu thereof to exercise its duties and
functior1s.
The court acknow Iedged the rule that every effort should
be made to uphold and harmonize a statute with the Constitution. but said that it should not shrink from its duty to declare an act unconstitutional where it appears to the court that
the Act conflicts with the Constirution, and said:
"{6} The electorate of this entire state has chosen
the plaintiff as its treasurer because of the confidence
it had in his ability to perform the duties of his office
and in his integrity. The act here questioned attempts
to take from him those duties which have belonged to
his office since statehood and prior thereto to the territorial treas~m:r. If he fails to measure up to the requirements of his office, that self-same electorate which
elected him to office can remove him; and if he fails to
keep safely the public funds entrusted to his care and
keeping, then he and his bondsmen will have to respond for any los~es sustained. To impose "ministers"
upon him '"horn he can neither hire nor fire and who
can choose thr: depositories for funds entrusted to his
care which, if lost, will result in liabilitv to him and his
bondsmen is an undue interference with his constitutional rights and duties. Who is there to say that the
app::'Jlant, the choice of the people of this state, is not
qualified to select deputies knowledgeable in financial
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matters as would be the members of the division of in.
vestments? Would it not be better to run the investment officer or the fiscal analyst for the office of state
treasurer at the next election if they be better qualified
for the job than is the appellant, than to divest the
state treasurer of the duties enjoined upon him by the
Constitution of this state?"
In Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Ut. 403, 393 P. 2d 795 ( 1964)
the Secretary of State asked the court to hold unconstitutional
the State Finance Act. This Act proposed to vest in the Governor and the newly created office of the Director of Finance
powers which plaintiff asserted were vested in the Board of
Examiners under Article VII, Section 13. Prior to this Act,
the Department of Finance only certified the availability of
funds and the Board of Examiners approved the disbursements.
Under the new Act, the Director of Finance assumed both the
duty of determining the availability of funds and also the prop·
riety of the expenditures. The court held that the power to
set or pass on salaries is necessarily included within the gen·
eral supervisory power over expenditures, and that authorizing
the Director of Finance to fix a schedule of salaries was un·
constitutional.
The court noted that essentially the same problem exist·
ed with respect to §63-2-15, in that it purported to confer
upon the Governor and the Director of Finance control over
travel and mileage. The same problem was presented by §63·
2-20, which purported to give the Governor and the Director
of Finance general budgetary control over all state departments
and institutions. The Act prohibited allowance of requirements '
by departments and the creation of obligation without the approval of the Director of Finance. The Act also provided that
it was the intent of the Legislature that the Department of Fi·

nance shall examine and pass upon all proposed expenditures.
This, the court said, could only mean that the Director could
approve or disapprove any proposal. The court said that since
rhe Constitution gave the Board of Examiners "the power to
examine all claims," it is only reasonable to assume that the
Constitution intended that the Board of Examiners should
perform that duty. The court, therefore, held that the statute
which undertook to vest these powers and duties in an agency
created by the Legislature was unconstitutional.
In Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Ut. 2d 412, 375
P. 2d 756, ( 1962) the court held that an act providing for the
creation of a civic auditorium and sports arena district was unconstitutional, in that it created a special commission which
encroached on the powers of counties, in violation of Article
VI, §29 of the Utah Constitution. This section provided:

"The legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property, or effects, whether held in
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site,
or to perform any municipal function."
In holding that the Civic Auditorium and Sports Arena

Act created a special commission in violation of this section,
the court said:
"Three conditions are necessary to violate this prov1s1on: I ) delegation to a private commission of power
to 2) interfere with municipal property or 3) to perform a municipal function . . . ."
"We are convinced that the framers of our state
constitution wisely anticipated the inroads that might
be cut in the structure of local, representative government, which fundamentally is composed of officials
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elected by those closest to government, the electors,
when they judiciously insisted on incorporating Art.
VI, sec. 29 as a must in our constitution. We hold that
this act attempted to create a special commission often.
sive to the plain terms of Art. VI, sec. 29."
In Hansen v. Legal Service Committee, 19 Ut. 2d 231,
419 P. 2d 979 (1967) the court held an act providing for
appointment of a legal adviser for the legislature was unconsti·
tutional, in that if encroached on the powers of the Attorney
General under Art. VII, § 18. The section simply provides:
"The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of the
State officers, and shall perform such other duties as
may be provided by law."
In Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Ut. 2d 383, 464 P. 2d 878
( 1970), the court held unconstitutional a law permitting the
president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House each to
appoint three members of the State Board of Higher Educa·
tion. The holding was that the power of appointment for
offices created by law is vested by the Constitution in the Gov·
ernor.
In Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. 1, 16 Ut. 2d ,
280, 399 P. 2d 440 ( 1965), the court said that the County
Service Act was unconstitutional because the innumerable ac·
tivities in which a service area may engage could emasculate '
the performance of municipal functions vested by the Constitution in local corporate authorities.
1

In Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, State Auditor, 77 Ut. 455,
297 P. 434 ( 1931), the court held that the Constitution had
vested in the Board of Examiners the power to examine all
claims. The court refused to read into the Constitution the
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concept that the Board of Examiners should pass only on
"unliquidated claims", and said that where the Constitution
has vested in the Board of Examiners the power to examine all
claims, except those exempted, the Legislature cannot delegate that power to any other board or officer.
Thus, in Utah we have a numbers of officers, boards and
commissions which are created by the Utah Constitution. Generally the Constitution does not endeavor to enumerate the
powc:rs of these constitutional agencies. The language in nearly
all cases is very general. The Legislature on many occasions
has undertaken to create a legislative officer or Board or Commission, to exercise part of such powers. The Utah Supreme
Court consistently has held these acts to be unconstitutional.
As we shall see, the Act here in great detail does delegate all
of the essential powers of higher education to the Higher
Board. We submit that this clearly violates Sec. 8 of Article
X, in that it encroaches on the power of the elected plaintiff
Board of Education, and that it violates Sec. 4, Art. X, because
it takes from the constitutional entity (the University) all of
the essential powers of the University, and attempts to vest
them in a separate ]'.:'.gal entity.

POINT

II

THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1969
DOES CREA T:~ AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY
TO SUPERVISE, CONTROL AND GOVERN
HIGHER EDUCATION IN VIOLATION OF
SEC. 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND DOES
CREA TE AN AGENCY INDEPENDENT OF
THE UNIVERSITY TO EXERCISE ALL ESSENTIAL UNIVERSITY FUNCTIONS.
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The Act, in Sec. 53-48-2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, expressly states that its purpose is to vest "in a single board the
power to govern the state system of higher education and within
the board's discretion to delegate certain powers to institutional
councils." The institutions enumerated are conceded by the
appellant to be a part of the public education system (which
is specifically defined by Section 2, Art. X) and which is by
Section 8 placed under the general supervision and control of
the State Board of Education.
Section 53-48-4 creates a state board of higher education,
which is empowered to sue and be sued and to contract and be
contracted with. The Act vests in this state board "the control,
management and supervision" of all of the institutions of
higher education, including the university. The language used
in the statute is substantially identical to the language of Sec.
8, Article X. The statute expressly vests "the control, management and supervision" of higher education in the appellant legislative board. The Constitution expressly vests "the
general control and supervision" of public education in the
respondent State Board. Under Section 53-48-4 the higher
board also expressly succeeds to all of the powers heretofore
held and exercised by the governing board of the University
of Utah and the Utah State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science. This section also places all other post high
school institutions under the higher board, except the technical
college at Salt Lake and the technical college at Provo, which,
are to "remain" under the management and control of the
State Board of Vocational Education, which is by statute (Sec.
53-16-2) also the State Board of Education. If the two technical :;chools are to "remain" under the elected board there
is certainly an implication that the other specifically enum10

i

1

erated institutions are not to remam under that board.
The state higher board is not required to function as the
Board of Regents did. The Board of Regents, when it made a
contract, did so in the name of the University of Utah. It was
the University of Utah acting by and through the authority of
its Board of Regents. In the Act, however, the higher board is
a separate agency, and it is to this separate agency that the
Legislature has delegated all of the powers, duties and responsibilities of the University. There can be no doubt that the Act
should be so construed. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate this.
In this regard see Sec. 53-48-17, of the Act, which ex-

pressly vesr.s in the higher board the power to approve or disapprove all new construction, repairs, the purchase of educational and general buildings, etc. This particular section concludes by stating that:
"No institution shall submit plans or specifications to
the state building board for the construction or alteration of buildings, structures, or facilities or for the purchases of equipment or fixtures therefor without the
authorization and approval of the board."
Sec. 5 3-48-10 ( 5) expressly provides that each university
may Jo its own purchasing, issue its own payroll, and handle
its own financial affairs "under the general supervision of the
board [the higher board} as provided in this act." Under subsection ( I ) of the same section all requests for state appropriations shall be prepared by the higher board, and a combined
appropriation shall be recommended. The section then expressly provides that the recommended budget for each institution shall be determined by the higher board "only after it
has * * * consulted with the various institutions."
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Under Sec. 53-48-21 the higher board is directed to consult with the institutional council and./ or the president of the
member institutions on matters pertaining to the respective insitutions. See also Sec. 5 3-48-7, infra, which authorizes the
Higher Board to transfer staff functions, the institutional budgets for those functions, and institutional personnel from the
institution to the Board; and Sec. 5 3-48-13, which gives the
Board control over the curriculum and programs, but provides that the institution can have a hearing before the Board
in regard thereto. Thus, under the Act the higher board is to
do the various things enumerated therein. In some cases the
institutions, as distinguished from the board, may do these
things under the supervision of the board. In other cases the
higher board may only function after consultation with the
institutions, but it is the higher board which performs the
function.
Referring back then to the specific powers granted to the
higher board, we again note that under Sec. 5 3-48-4 it may sue
and be sued in its own name and it may contract and be contracted with. The Act vests in the higher board the control,
management and supervision of all of the institutions of higher
education now existing and those which may hereafter be
created.
Section 5 3-48-5 ( 5) contemplates that the state board
shall have its own staff and chief executive officer. The board
also under sub-section ( 6) is to appoint its own treasurer.
Under Sec. 53-48-6 the board is directed to appoint a commissioner to serve as the chief executive officer of the board.
The board sets his salary.
12

Sec. 53-48-7 provides for the appointment of professional
administrative personnel. It then goes on to say that the board
may transfer to its staff functions from one or more of the institutions in the state system of higher education. It also indicates that funds therefore budgeted for the institutions for performance of that function may be transferred from that institution to the higher board. This is one section in which the
statute clearly recognizes that the institution is one entity and
the higher board another. This section also permits the higher
board to transfer personnel from the institution staff to its own
staff.
Section 5 3-48-8, in very broad language, places the management, supervision and control of the entire higher education system under the higher board, including the making of
a master plan, a definition of roles and programs for each institution, determining the needs for new programs, or the elimination or curtailment of existing programs, authorizes the
higher board to initiate financing, to establish the operating
and capital needs of each institution, and the system as a whole.
It concludes by saying that the board "shall be responsible for,
and is hereby empowered to do all things necessary for the
effective implementation of a state-wide master plan, as adopted
and revised by the board from time to time." The plaintiff state
board is then directed to provide vocational education staff
assistance in support of master planning. Again, the only
recognition of any role by the plaintiff board is in connection
with the technical schools. "All" other master planning "shall"
be done by the legislatively created higher board.
Section 5 3-48-12 empowers the higher board to establish all institutional roles, except those specifically assigned by
the Legislature. It authorizes this board to prescribe the general

course of study to be offered to each institution. Sec. 5 3-48-13
gives the board control over the University's curriculwn. This
section authorizes each institution to make changes, which the
institution deems necessary, but requires that notice of any
change in the curriculwn shall be promptly submitted to the
Board. The section authorizes the board to review programs,
including those funded by gifts, grants and contracts, and
authurize the board to require modification or even to terminate any such program.

If the program is to be modified or terminated, the institution can have a hearing before the board - thus again the
statute recognizes the separateness of the board and the institution. This section concludes by giving the plaintiff state
board some voice in the curriculwn for the technical colleges,
so as to coordinate these courses with the programs in the high
schools and the area vocational centers - thus again indicating that the plaintiff board is to have no voice except in relationship to the technical colleges.
Sec. 5 3-48-14 gives the higher board control over the
degrees to be awarded, and requires the prior approval of the
board of the adequacy of the course of work and of the propriety of the particular institutions issuing the degree. Sec.
53-48-15 authorizes the board to employ the president, fix his
salary and to dicharge him. The board also has the power, if
it wants to reserve it, to hire all the administrative staff for the
university, including the administrative officers, the deans of
the schools, the professors, associate and assistant professors,
and could prescribe their duties and determine their salaries.
The board also could reserve to itself the power to provide for
the constitution and organization of the faculty and the admin-
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istration and to enact rules and regulations for the government
of the faculty. It is also indicated in sub-section ( 5) that the
board could reserve to itself the power to control the direction
of instruction and of examination and of admissions. Under
sub-section ( 6) it could reserve the power to enact rules for
the operation of the institution. These powers are all delegated
by the statute to the institutions or their presidents, unless the
board elects to reserve them for itself, but if it elects to reserve these powers, it obviously has complete control over
personnel and even over the direction of instruction and of the
examination and administration of students.
Sec. 53-48-16 provides that the higher board shall succeed
to and be vested with all powers and authority relating to all
properties of the institutions, and to the control and management thereof. Under Sec. 53-48-17 the higher board "shall
approve or disapprove" all construction and repair, and specifically provide that no "institution" may present any plan to the
building board without the higher board's approval.
We submit that the only reasonable construction of the
act is that except for a minor role in the management of the
technical colleges, the entire management, supervision and
control of all of the institutions of higher education has been
"vested" in the defendant board. There is no function left to
the plaintiff board. The act did not intend to leave general
control and supervision in the plaintiff board. In language
substantially identical to Section 8, the Act vests control and
supervision in the higher board. The Act also vests in the
higher board all the powers of the University. In the exercise
of these powers the board is to consult with the University and
the other institutions, but the ultimate power is with the board.
15

The powers given to the higher board are so all-inclusive as
to render everything in Article X, Sec. 4 meaningless. If the
Legislature can create a separate agency to exercise the powers
over the University, which are given to the higher board by
this act, then the establishment of the University, which Section
4 confirms, and the rights, immunities, franchises and endowments which Section 4 perpetuates, are meaningless.
POINT

III

IT WAS THE INTENTION OF ARTI CLE X,
SEC. 4 TO PERPETUATE THE LOCATION AND
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNIVERSIY UNDER EXISTING LAW AND TO PERPETUATE
ALL RIGHTS, IMMUNITITES, FRANCHISES
AND ENDOWMENTS WHICH WERE CREATED OR CONFERRED ON THE UNIVERSITY
PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.
\Ve acknowledge that the status of the University of
Utah and the state Agriculture College under the Constitution
have heretofore been before this court. See Spence v. Utah
State Agriwlture College. 119 Ut. 104, 225 P. 2d 18
( 1950); State Board of Education v. Commission of Finance, 122 Ut. 164, 247 P. 2d 435 ( 1952) ;University of Utah
v. Board of Examiners, 4 Ut. 2d 408, 295 P. 2d 348 ( 1956).
We inttrpret these decisions to have held nothing more than
that the University of Utah and the agricultural college (now
U.S.U.) are subject to other constitutional entities and officers.
The Higher Education Act of 1969 is the first attempt
in the history of Utah for a legislative body to substantially
alter the function and role of the University of Utah. This
court must distinguish between legislative action designed to
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assist the University in meeting current needs and problems
and legislative action directed at substantially altering its form
and function.
We would respectfully ask the court to further consider
the matter discussed in some detail by Mr. Justice Worthen in
University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, supra, wherein he
indicated that the University should under the constitutional
language be subject to all laws enacted by the legislature from
time to time, because of the phrase in Sec. 4, Article X which
refer~ to existing laws. This language only occurs in the section which reads, "The location and establishment by existing laws of the University of Utah," are hereby perpetuated. We do urge that the phrase "existing laws" should
be construed only as relating to the location and establishment
of the University under existing laws, and that it was not intended by those who framed the Constitution to give the legislature the power to take from the University any of the rights,
immunities, franchises and endowments which were granted
before the Constitution was adopted. The very next phrase of
Sec. 4 says that these rights, immunities, franchises and endowments "heretofore granted or conferred" are hereby perpetuated unto said university. This language specifically does not
contain the phrase "under existing laws."
We also direct the court's attention to the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Crockett, who said:
"I concur in the opinion of Justice Worthen, adding
this comment: It appears to have been the purpose
of the constitutional founders ro continue the University as a public corporation permanently. Except to
the extent stated below, I do not believe that the
problems now confronting us require any further re-
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finement upon the contention of the University that it
is 'a constitutional corporation, the highest form of
juristic person known to the law, except the state
itself * * *.'
"It would undoubtedly require a change in the Constitution to abolish the University or to change substantially its nature or function. With respect to its
corporate status and existence, it is beyond the power
of the legislative control. The importance and desirability of a high degree of independence of internal
function, and of academic freedom, was unquestionably recognized by the founders. We are not here concerned with any question of interference with the corporate existence of the operation of the institution in
any manner that would substantially alter its function
as a University. A different question would arise
should the legislature deliberately attempt to do so,
or act so capriciously or arbitrarily with respect to
appropriations or budgetary matters that such would be
the effect of its action. Fortunately, we are not faced
with any such problem, nor does anything here confronting us give rise to any apprehension that we will
be."
We submit that the Act does raise the problem of changing substantially the nature and function of the University,
as noted by Mr. Justice Crockett. We further respectfully submit that the inclusion of Sec. 4 in the Constitution was intentional, and that it was intended to perpetuate more than the
existence and location of the University. The matter was the
subject of considerable debate in the Constitutional Convention. These provide considerable insight into the concerns of
the delegates.
Following considerable discussion of the difficulty of the
high schools and universities as part of the common school
system, Mr. Cannon at page 386-387 says, Mr. Chairman, I do
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not understand this antipathy to the high school or to the
university. I do not understand why the gentleman from the
third precinct should make this motion at this time or why we
should feel that we are too weak at this stage of our history
to support a university. As far back as the 28th day of February, 1850, the provisional government of this then supposedto-be state provided for a creation of a university. It was little
more than two years after they had come into these valleys and
at that time, they had scarcely enough to keep themselves
alive; though they were poor in every sense of the word, sofar
as wealth was concerned, they sought to establish then the
foundations of this university. Why should we, after 35 years,
feel too weak to perpetuate an institution which the pioneers
themselves attempted to found? For years it struggled along
scarcely recognized by public appropriation and attempted to
encourage among the people of this territory a love for higher
education and to do that which it could to elevate the educational standard among the people. Why should we now say,
that in our constitution we shall not make mention nor provide
for the establishment or perpetuity of this University that was
thus early prepared and founded by those who came into these
valleys .... " Mr. Richards on the same page said, ". . . . I
think myself that there would be serious danger in leaving this
matter to the legislature. We attempt here to prescribe what
shall be done in regard to the establishment and maintenance
of public schools, and if we cut this and say that it shall not
be part of the public school system, I think it is a very serious
guestion as to whether the legislature of the new state would
be enabled to engraph that onto the system . . . . " He was
discussing the inclusion of the high schools and universities
as part of the public school system.
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At one point in the deliberations, Delegate Snow moved
to strike section 4 from the constitution saying, "Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out section 4. My object for moving to
strike it out is this, that all the rights, immunities, franchises,
and endowments that the University now enjoys will be ratified
and perpetuated on the article on schedule, and that it is unnecessary to repeat it here." The article on the schedule is
Article XXIV of the Utah Constitution wherein specifically the
rights and immunities of contract and the continuation of territorial law are guaranteed. It will be noted that the motion was
defeated and that Sec. 4 was included in the Constitution.
The next major topic in the education field for the convention was the unification of the University of Utah and the
agricultural college. Much was made of the point of economy
and the ability to perpetuate a higher quality education by
consolidation of the University and college. The perennial
discussion of duplication and elimination of unnecessary programs and expenses is covered in quite some depth between
the pages of 1238 and the end of the section on education at
1374. However, the main point which we can derive from this
discussion is that the convention concluded that two institutions, for various reasons, were better than one, and that the
independence of the University of Utah and the agricultural
college should be preserved. To provide some chronology to
the minutes, and illustrate the nature of the discussion, the
follo-wing passages are noted:
At 1249 Delegate Lund said, "Mr. Chairman, I sincerely
hope that the amendment striking out the words, 'agricultural
college' will prevail. They are separate institutions. They are
under separate boards and they have separate objects and ends
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and aims in their instruction. The agricultural college in its
instruction is preparing its students for industrial professionsfor trades .... When the legislature established the agricultural
college, it did not see fit to place it alongside the University,
and the reason beyond a doubt was that if it were placed near
the University, and especially placed under the same Board,
under the same supervision, the object of the agricultural college would be thwarted. Students would not be prepared for
their trades, but they would be prepared for the university."
At 1264 and 1265 Delegate Snow, in discussing the question of whether the Constitutional Convention ought to resolve the issue, "It is the permanency of this question that I
direct your attention to. If you permanently locate the college
in Logan, the University perhaps at Salt lake City - it is in
the constitution and if the economy should dictate the absolute
necessity at some future time of uniting them, you are handicapped by this constitutional provision. Also, you have no
precedent for it, and it would seem to me to be a matter that
should be left to the legislature, whether they will have more
time at their disposal, can get more information, and have time
to mature a more deliberate judgment on the question of
whether they should be united permanently or separated permanc:ntly."
Delegate Cannon at 1348 in discussing the advantages of
the Salt lake City site and the future of the educational opportunities at the University of Utah, makes specific note of the
possibility of establishing a school of mines, a medical school,
and a law school, all three of which have come to fruition at
rhe University of Utah.
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Delegate Roberts, (page 1364) said, "I am not willing
that it should be left to the legislature when we are so nearly
within the settlement of this question. Settle it now, and I
tell you that one year, two years will not pass until you discover
that you have conferred great benefits upon the people of Utah.
I am willing. Sir, to go as far as any other man in leaving as
much as possible to the legislature. But I am not willing to
skip this important question and shuttle it off on future legislatures."
Delegate Farr at 1366 said: "This idea of leaving all to
the next legislature to quarrel and to wrangle over, have so
many fine speeches that we have had here overheard, and spent
half a session and few thousand or few hundred thousand
dollars in wrangling over that from session, I am opposed to it.
I say, let us fix it, and have the Agricultural College at Logan,
the facilities being all there, and let us have the University and
be united in it." At the conclusion of the discussion a motion
was made (page 13 72) to consolidate all institutions of higher
education. This was rejected, and Article X, with Section 4
retained therein, was adopted by a vote of 98 for, 3 against, and
5 being absent. (page 1374) (Emphasis added)
The above discussion clearly demonstrates that it was not
the intention of Sec. 4 to leave to the legislature the power to
consolidate the University of Utah and the Agricultural College (now U.S.U.) nor to place them under one board. A
motion to do this was rejected. Also, we submit that the delegates did not want to leave to the legislature the location,
existence. powers, rights, immunities, franchises and endow·
men ts.
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There can be no question that the founding fathers confirmed the establishment of two separate entities and the location of the University of Utah at Salt Lake City and the Agricultural College at Logan. The single-mindedness of the Constitutional Convention delegates in their consideration of Section 4 is ample evidence that while they were not at all unmindful of th e effects of confirming two separate institutions
at rwo somewhat distant locations, the proponents of unification of the institutions under one board did not prevail. As the
minutes of the convention demonstrate, the intent of he framers of he constitution was to establish and locate two separate
institutions of higher learning with different purposes and
objectives for the benefit of the people of the state. Their
actions expressly rejected combining them either in form, in
location or under the direction of the same governing board.
The minutes reflect the profound awareness that any means of
connection or combination whether by the constitution itself or
by permitting some future Legislature to engraft one to the
other would seriously endanger the certainty of continued
operation of each, the ability to fulfill their respective roles,
purposes and objectives, and the ability of the state to provide
quality higher education. (See the minutes of the Constitutional Convention for March 26, 1895, pp. 386-387; April
20, 1885, pp. 1237-1287; April 22, 1895, pp. 1304-1313;
April 23, 1895, pp. 1331-1374.)
In any event, it is submitted that the trial court is correct
in its holding that the Higher Education Act of 1969 is unconstitutional. There is no way that the Higher Board can perform
the duties and exercise the powers specifically given to it by
stature without encroaching on the power of the State Board
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of Education. Further, we submit that Section 4, dealing with
the University, was intentionally adopted by those who framed
the Constitution, and that it does mean something more than
that the University was perpetuated until the legislature elected
to pass some other or different law. As between the State
Board of Education and the University, there has heretofore
been a stipulation entered and approved by the court. Whether
or not the rights of public agencies can be fixed by stipulation may be debatable. Nevertheless, these parties have agreed,
and it probably is res judicata as to how they should function
under Section 4 and Section 8.
The appellant has over and over agam asserted that
there is a strong presumption that the statute is constitutional;
that the court only ought to declare otherwise under somewhat
extreme conditions. All of the cases we have cited in the early
part of our brief are cases where the court has declared a legislative act to be unconstitutional. We think that the correct
rule in this regard was stated by Allen v. Rampton, supra.
Appellant has noted in its brief that where there has been
an acquiescence by the legislature or long-standing interpretation, it is entitled to considerable weight. We, however, direct
the court's attention to Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Ut. 224, 151 P. 2d 467 ( 1944) and New Park v.
Tax Commission, 113 Ut. 410, 196 P. 2d 485, where the Utah
Supreme Court held that interpretation out of harmony and
contrary to the express provisions of a statute cannot be given
any weight. To do so would in effect amend the statute by
erroneous construction, and substitute construction for legis-
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Jacion. The same rule should apply in constitutional law, and
legislative interpretation out of harmony with the Constitution
should be held to be a mere nullity.
The transfer of authority back to the Board of Regents
for the University of Utah, and to the Trustees for Utah State
Univerity may not need new legislation. Those statutes which
were repealed by the Higher Education Act of 1969 may be
revived on the basis that they were unconstitutionally repealed.
Earl T. Crawford in his work, Statutory Construction, 1940
Edition, states on page 662 as follows:
"In order for a repealing act to be effective, it may

be stated as a general rule, chat it must be constitutional

and valid, since a void or ineffective act obviously cannot operate to abrogate a valid existing one. "
On page 664, Crawford continues:
"After a statute has been repealed, it may again become operative as law, either through the enactment
of legislation expresly reviving it, or by the operation
of law."
This general principle is fully adhered to by the Supreme Court
of rhe Scace of Utah. In the case of Board of Education of Ogden
City v. Hunter, 159 Pacific 1019 and specifically on page
1024 rhe court states as follows:
"The only question that remains to be determined
is, What is the legal effect of declaring the provision
aforesaid invalid? It is now well settled that in case
ic is found that an entire statute, or only a particular
provision of a statute, is invalid for any reason and a
statute so found invalid has expressly or by necessary
implication repealed another statute or provision upon
the same subject, so much of the former statute which
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was superseded by the invalid portion of the later one
is not repealed but continues in full force and effect."
We respectfully submit that the trial court is correct, and
its decision should be affirmed. We further submit that the
University of Utah and Utah State University are entitled to
separate corporate existence, and separate governing boards, and
that an effort to consolidate them be expressly rejected by those
who framed the Constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
'.EDWARD W. CLYDE and
HENRY S. NYGAARD
Attorneys for the
University of Utah
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